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Abstract
In this paper we argue that government procurement policy played a role in stimulating
the wave of innovation that hit the US economy in the 1980s, as well as the simultaneous
increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the early 1980s U.S. policy
makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus
on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by
increasing the market-size of innovative rms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy
tool. We build a quality-ladders non-scale growth model with heterogeneous industries
and endogenous supply of skills, and show both theoretically and empirically that increases
in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raises the wage of skilled
workers and, at the same time, stimulates human capital accumulation. A calibrated
version of the model suggests that government policy explains up to 32 percent of the
observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1978-91.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ects of both demand and supply-side innovation policy tools on tech-
nical change and wage inequality. Government policy consists of incresing the technological
composition of public procurement, the demand-side tool, and of subsidies to R&D, the supply-
side tool. Technical change is endogenous and government action produces both a reduction
in innovation costs and a market-size e¤ect that increase the protability of innovative rms,
thus stimulating investments in innovation. As innovation is a skill-using activity, government
policy increases the relative demand of skills and the skill-premium.
In the early 1980s we observe a substantial increase in government investment in high-tech
sectors: investment in equipment and software (E&S), which was 20 percent of total government
investment in 1980, climbs to about 40 percent in 1990 and to more than 50 percent in 2001.
The composition of private investment also switched towards E&S but more than a decade
later, catching up with the public trend in the 1990s. This suggests that government played an
important role in providing producers of new investment goods with the appropriate market size.
We argue that this change in the composition of public spending reallocated market-size from
low-tech to high-tech industries, thus enlarging the market for more innovative products and
stimulating innovation. Missing data on the technological content of other kinds of government
expenditure, we resort to the available data on government investment composition as a sample
for the true composition of total government procurement. Our analysis remarks that lthough
government procurement is not an explicit policy tool, it works as de factoinnovation policy
instrument.
The introduction of the Research and Experimentation tax credit in 1981 was explicitly
targeted at stimulating commercial innovation. The credit was designed to stimulate company
R&D over time by reducing its after-tax cost. Specically, companies that qualied for the credit
could deduct or subtract from corporate income taxes an amount that in the period 1981-2004
has been in the range of 20 to 25 percent of qualied research expenses above a base amount.
The credit rate was initially set at 25 per cent of incremental research and development:
incremental meant above the level of the previous year in 1981, and in the following years the
increase was measured over the average R&D spending in the previous three years. The credit
rate was also reduced to 20 per cent from 1982 onward. Although the credit rate has been
pretty constant, its incremental feature generates a persistent incentive for private rms to
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increase their R&D investment over time.
In this paper we introduce government spending and R&D subsidies in a neo-Schumpeterian
growth framework with heterogeneous industries. The core theoretical part of the paper is
related to the construction of a mechanism that links the composition of public spending to
relative wages.The introduction of R&D subsidies is standard and is conned to the calibration
exercise.
We build a version of the quality-ladders growth model with endogenous supply of skills
(Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999). A new and key feature of the model is the introduction
of heterogeneous industries. The economy is populated with a continuum of sectors with
asymmetric innovation power; in the language of quality-ladders models this implies that each
sector has a di¤erent quality-jump any time an innovation arrives. In this setting we introduce
government policy, in the form of a public spending rule: the government can allocate its
expenditure in manufactured goods using a continuum of di¤erent policy rules, from the extreme
symmetric rule, each sector gets the same share of public spending, to an asymmetric rule, the
sector with the highest quality jump gets the highest spending.
In our model high-tech sectors are those where innovation brings technological improve-
ments, quality jumps, that are greater than average. There are two activities in the economy:
manufacturing, carried out by a continuum of asymmetric rms, and innovation activity or
production of ideas. We suppose unskilled labor is used exclusively in manufacturing and that
ideas are produced using skilled labor. There are two basic mechanisms in the model that link
government policy to wage inequality. First, as the government reallocates spending from low
to high-tech sectors aggregate prots increase. Intuitively, higher quality jumps in high-tech
sectors implies higher mark-ups and larger prots. Hence, a redistribution of public spending in
favor of these sectors rises aggregate prots in the economy. This increase in total prots trig-
gers, via inter-sector innovation arbitrage, an increase in the relative demand of skilled workers
and in their relative wage. Second, we model a innovation cost-reducing policy in the form of
a standard symmetric innovation subsidy that increases prots in all sectors at the same rate,
thus producing a general incentive to innovate that raises the demand for skilled workers in all
sectors of the economy.
Finally, there is a training choice in the model that endogenizes skills formation and, as a
consequence, policy has also a positive e¤ect on the relative supply of skilled workers. Therefore,
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our model is able to match two basic stylized facts of the U.S. labor market in the 1980s and
1990s, the contemporary increase in the supply of skills and in the skill premium (see Acemoglu
2002a gure 1).
We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation, in order to include all those activities that
are targeted to increase rmsprots. In our model workers performing innovative activities
are those workers that, with their intellectual skills, contribute to give a rm a competitive
advantage over the others. Therefore, we do not restrict our view to R&D activities. While
R&D workers play an important role in innovation, they are not the only skilled workforce that
a rm needs to beat its rivals: managerial and organizational activities, marketing, legal and
nancial services are all widely and increasingly used by modern corporations to compete in
the marketplace.
This paper is related to the literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC).1 Like works
in this line of research, we focus on the role of technical change in a¤ecting the U.S. wage
structure in recent decades. In our paper innovation is skill-biased by assumption, as in models
of exogenous SBTC (i.e. Aghion, Howitt, Violante 2002, Caselli 1999, Galor and Moav 2000,
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, Violante 2000), but technical change is endogenous, as in models
of endogenous SBTC (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, Kiley 1998).2 We share with endogenous
technology models the idea that innovation is prot-driven and that market-size is one key de-
terminant of protability. Like endogenous SBTC models, we explore the sourcesof technical
change, but while these works focus on the market-size e¤ect produced by the increase in the
relative supply of skills, in our paper the source of the market-size e¤ect is government spend-
ing. Moreover, strictly speaking, our model is not a model of SBTC in the sense that innovation
does not increase the productivity of skilled workers. In our framework, as in Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (1999), innovation is simply a skill-intensive activity and wage inequality increases
with the size of this activity.
Our paper is related to the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) version of the quality-ladder
growth model. With respect to this work, our contribution is the following: rst, on the theory
side, the introduction of asymmetric steady states allows government spending to a¤ect inno-
vation and the skill premium. This is not obtainable with a simple introduction of government
1For a review of this literature see Acemoglu (2002), Aghion (2002) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante
(2005).
2Galor and Moav (2000) in section IV introduce endogenous technical change through human capital accu-
mulation.
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spending into the Dinopoulos and Segerstroms symmetric framework. Second, while their ap-
plication focus on trade liberalization as the source of technical change and wage inequality,
we focus on the role of government policy. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to assess
the relevance of the policy channel in the debate on technical change and wage inequality in
the U.S.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts on government policy
and wage inequality. Section 3 sets up the model. Sections 4 and 5 derive the main results
and explain the intuitions for the macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric steady states.
Section 6 provides econometric evidence of the signicance of the channel we highlight in this
paper. In section 7 we perform a calibration exercise and test the models predictions against
the observed change in wage inequality. Section 8 provides remarks on the qualitative and
quantitative predictions of the model. Section 9 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs
of our models propositions and a description of US tax credit policy.
2 Stylized facts
In this section we provide some background evidence on the two policy tools on which we
focus in the model, public spending composition and R&D subsidies, and on their relation with
innovation and wage inequality. We postpone a formal econometric and calibration analyses to
Sections 6 and 7.
2.1 Government spending composition and wage inequality: main
features
The rst set of facts that we analyze is related to the dynamics of public investment compo-
sition - the only available proxy for public procurement technological composition - and wage
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Although government procurement has never been an ex-
plicit policy tool it has always worked as a de facto relevant innovation policy instrument.
David Hart presents the argument in the following way: [public] R&D spending was typically
accompanied by other measures that deserve at least as much credit for their technological
payo¤s. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) not only funded much of the phys-
ical science and engineering R&D that led to advances in semiconductors and computers, it
also purchased a large fraction of products themselves, especially the most advanced products.
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The DOD guaranteed that a market for electronics would exist, inducing private investment
on a scale that would not have otherwise followed even the most promising research results
(Hart 1998 p.1). Public procurement guaranteed a market to innovative rms, especially in
early stages of product development. There is evidence that the DOD, NASA and also other
government agencies, such as the Department of Health, contributed to private innovation via
demand-pull (Ruttan 2003, and Finkelstein 2003).
In this paper we will propose an aggregate measure of this demand-pull channel for innova-
tion. More precisely, the market-size e¤ect that we model in the next section will be driven by
the composition of public investment. We use BEA NIPA data that break-up public investment
between E&S and structures. E&S includes a group of investment goods that are considered
more innovative than those included in structures, so we choose E&S as our high-tech aggre-
gate.3
In gure 1 we report the evolution of the skill premium and of the composition of gov-
ernment investment spending - expressed as the ratio of government investment in E&S over
total government investment. The relevant fact here is that both series jump onto a strongly
increasing path in the late 1970s early 1980s. This common and contemporaneous trend change
suggests that the shift towards high-tech public spending, which started around 1974 and rad-
ically accelerated around 1978, might have had an inuence on rising inequality in the 1980s.4
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 shows that both the composition of public and private investment progressively
shifted towards E&S since the late 1970s. The gure also suggests that public investment led
the way and private investment followed with a lag of about a decade. Comparing public and
private investment in E&S we nd that the yearly average growth rate of private investment
is 9 percent while the growth rate of public investment is almost double, 16 percent in the
period 1970-90; private spending catches up only in the 1990s. Finally, using the same data
it is possible to show that in 1978 the ratio of public to private investment in the innovative
aggregate is 13 percent, it increases during the 1980s to reach a peak of 26 percent in 1990,
3See supportive evidence in Cummins and Violante 2002, and Hobijn (2001b). We consider only invest-
ment spending because there is no aggregate data that keeps track of the technological composition of public
consumption expenditures.
4We are not interested in explaining the decline in the skill premium observed in the 1970s. For this reason
the weaker correlation between the two series in the 1970s does not a¤ect our argument.
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and then starts declining.5
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As R&D represents an important part of the innovation activity, gure 3 shows that, as it
was the case for public spending composition, also the trend of private R&D/GDP becomes
strongly increasing in the late 1970s - along with that of the skill premium.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The R&D subsidy discussed above a¤ects exclusively the incentives to invest in R&D, while
the technological composition of government procurement a¤ects the market-size of all kinds
of innovation activities, of which R&D is a relevant but not the only component.
3 The model
3.1 Households
Households di¤er in their members ability to become skilled workers, and the ability, , is
uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Households have identical intertemporally addi-
tively separable and unit elastic preferences for an innite set of consumption goods indexed
by ! 2 [0; 1], and each is endowed with a unit of labor/study time endowment whose supply
generates no disutility. Households choose their optimal consumption bundle for each date by
solving the following optimization problem:
max
Z 1
0
N0e
 ( n)t log u(t)dt (1)
subject to
log u(t) 
Z 1
0
log
24jmax(!;t)X
j=0
j!q(j; !; t)
35 d!
c(t) 
Z 1
0
24jmax(!;t)X
j=0
p(j; !; t)q(j; !; t)
35 d!
W(0) + Z(0) 
Z 1
0
N0e
  R t0 (r() n)dTdt =
Z 1
0
N0e
  R t0 (r() n)dc(s)dt
5This indicates that the relative importance of public E&S is not negligible in the period of interest.
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where N0 is the initial population and n is its constant growth rate,  is the common rate of
time preference - with  > n - and r(t) is the market interest rate. q(j; !; t) is the per-member
ow of good ! 2 [0; 1] of quality j 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g purchased by a household of ability  2 (0; 1)
at time t  0. p(j; !; t) is the price of good ! of quality j at time t, c(t) is nominal expenditure,
and W(0) and Z(0) are human and non-human wealth levels. A new vintage of a good !
yields a quality equal to ! times the quality of the previous vintage, with ! > 1. Di¤erent
versions of the same good ! are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting
for their quality ratios, and jmax(!; t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ! is
available at time t. As is common in quality ladders models we will assume price competition6
at all dates, which implies that in equilibrium only the top quality product is produced and
consumed in positive amounts. T is a per-capita lump-sum tax.
The instantaneous utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution and this implies
that goods are perfect substitutes, once you account for quality. Thus, households maximize
static utility by spreading their expenditures evenly across the product line and by purchasing
in each line only the product with the lowest price per unit of quality, that is the product of
quality j = jmax(!; t). Hence, the households demand of each product is:
q(j; !; t) =
c(t)
p(j; !; t)
for j = jmax(!; t) and is zero otherwise (2)
The presence of a lump sum tax does not change the standard Euler equation:
:
c
c
= r(t)   (3)
Individuals are nitely lived members of innitely lived households, being continuously born
at rate , and dying at rate , with   = n > 0; D > 0 denotes the exogenously given duration
of their life7. People are altruistic in that they care about their households total discounted
utility according to the intertemporally additive functional shown in (1). They choose to train
and become skilled, if at all, at the beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their
training period, during which the individual cannot work, has an exogenous duration T < D.
6All qualitative results maintain their validity under the opposite assumption of quantity competition.
7As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999, p.454) it is easy to show that the above parameters cannot be
chosen independently, but that they must satisfy  = n
enD 1 and  =
nenD
enD 1 in order for the number of births
at time t to match the number of deaths at t+D.
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Hence an individual with ability  decides to train if and only if:Z t+D
t
e 
R s
t r()wL(s)ds <
Z t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t r()max (   ; 0)wH(s)ds,
with 0 <  < 1=2. The ability parameter is dened so that a person with ability  >  is able
to accumulate skill (human capital)    after training, while a person with ability below this
cut-o¤ gains no human capital from training.
We will focus on the steady state analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rates
and wL, wH , and c are all constant. It easily follows that r(t) =  at all dates, and that the
individual will train if and only if her ability is higher than
0 =
 
1  e D =  e Tr   e D wL
wH
+    wL
wH
+ . (4)
The supply of unskilled labor at time t is
L(t)  0N(t) =


wL
wH
+ 

N(t) (5)
We set wL = 1, so the unskilled wage to be our numeraire. Following the same steps as
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) the reader can easily verify that the supply of skilled labor
at time s is
H(t) = (0 + 1  2) (1  0)N(t)=2, (6)
with 0 <  =
 
en(D TR)   1 =  enD   1 < 1. In steady state the growth rate of L(t) and H(t)
is equal to n.
3.2 Manufacturing
Firms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption good ! 2 [0; 1] of the second
best quality under a constant return to scale (CRS) technology with one worker producing one
unit of product. However in each industry the top quality product can be manufactured only
by the rm that has discovered it, whose rights are protected by a perfectly enforceable patent
law. We will choose unskilled labor wage as the numeraire, that is: wL = 1.
As usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman
1991 and Aghion and Howitt 1998) the next quality of a given good is invented by means of
innovation activity performed by challenger rms in order to earn monopoly prots that will
be destroyed by the next innovator. During each temporary monopoly the patent holder can
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sell the product at prices higher than the unit cost. We assume that the patent expires when
further innovation occurs in the industry. Hence the monopolist rents are destroyed not only by
obsolescence but also because a competitive fringe can copy the product using the same CRS
technology.
The unit elastic demand structure8 encourages the monopolist to set the highest possible
price to maximize prots, but the existence of a competitive fringe sets a ceiling to it equal to
the world lowest unit cost of the previous quality product. This allows us to conclude that the
price p (jmax(!; t); !; t) of every top quality good is:
p (jmax(!; t); !; t) = !, for all ! 2 [0; 1] and t  0. (7)
Here we introduce the crucial feature of the model: the government sector specic per-capita
spending G!(t)  0, for all ! 2 [0; 1] and t  0. The Government uses tax revenues to nance
public spending in di¤erent sectors and we assume that the government budget is balanced
at every date: N(t)T (t) = N(t)
R 1
0
G!(t)d! . Moreover we will assume N(t)T (t) < N(t)=a,
i.e. T (t) < =a, in order to guarantee that public expenditure is feasible. Since we will be
interested in steady states, in which per-capita variables are constant, from now on we will
drop time indexes from per-capita taxation and per-capita public expenditure.
>From the static consumer demand (2) we can immediately conclude that the demand for
each product ! is:
N(t)
R 1
0
cd
!
+
N(t)G!
!
 cN(t)
!
+
N(t)G!
!
= q!, (8)
where c =
R 1
0
cd is average per-capita consumption. Sectoral market clearing conditions imply
that demand equal production of every consumption good by the rm that monopolizes it, q!.
It follows that the stream of monopoly prots accruing to the monopolist which produces a
state-of-the-art quality product will be equal to:
(!; t) = q! (!   1) = (cN(t) +G!N(t))

1  1
!

. (9)
Hence a rm that produces good ! has an expected discounted value that satises
v(!; t) =
!
+ I(!; t) 
:
v(!;t)
v(!;t)
=
q! (!   1)
+ I(!; t) 
:
v(!;t)
v(!;t)
,
8Any CES utility index with elasticity of substitution not greater than one would imply this result.
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where I(!; t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the
monopolists prots in industry !. In a steady state where per-capita variables all grow at the
same rate, it is easy to prove that
:
v(!;t)
v(!;t)
= n. Hence the expected value of a rm becomes
v(!; t) =
q! (!   1)
+ I(!; t)  n . (10)
3.3 Innovation races
In each industry the leaders are challenged by the innovation activity of the followers that
employ skilled workers and produce a probability intensity of inventing the next version of
their products. The arrival rate of innovation in industry ! at time t is I(!; t), and it is
the aggregate summation of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D rms
targeting product !.
In each sector new ideas are introduced according to a Poisson arrival rate of innovation
by use of a CRS technology characterized by the unit cost function bwHX(!; t), with b > 0
common in all industries, and X(!; t) > 0 measuring the di¢ culty of innovation in industry !.
Hence the production of ideas is formally equivalent to buying a lottery ticket that confers to
its owner the exclusive right to the corresponding innovation prots, with the aggregate rate of
innovation proportional to the number of ticketspurchased. The Poisson specication of the
innovative process implies that the individual contribution to innovation by each skilled labor
unit gives an independent (additive) contribution to the aggregate instantaneous probability
of innovation: hence innovation productivity is the same if each skilled worker undertakes its
activity by working alone as when she works with others in large rms.
The technological complexity index X(!; t) has been introduced into endogenous growth
theory after Charles Jones(1995) empirical criticism of R&D based growth models generating
scale e¤ects in the steady state per-capita growth rate. According to Segerstroms (1998) inter-
pretation of Jones(1995) solution to the strong scale e¤ectproblem (Jones 2005), X(!; t) is
increasing in the accumulated stock of e¤ective innovation:
:
X(!; t)
X(!; t)
= I(!; t), (TEG)
with positive , thus formalizing the idea that early discoveries sh out the easier inventions
rst, leaving the most di¢ cult ones for the future. This formulation implies that increasing
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di¢ culty of innovation causes per-capita GDP growth to vanish over time unless an ever-
increasing share of resources are invested in innovation, thereby requiring a growing educated
population.9 In the present framework with quality improving consumer goods growth is
interpreted as the increase over time of the representative consumer utility level.
For industries targeted by innovation the constant returns to innovation activity and free
entry and exit imply the no arbitrage condition
v(!; t)  q! (!   1)
+ I(!; t)  n = bwHX(!; t). (11)
The usual Arrow or replacement e¤ect (Aghion and Howitt 1992) implies that the monopolist
does not nd it protable to undertake any innovation activity at the equilibrium wages.
4 Balanced growth paths
We are now in a position to analyze the general equilibrium implications of the previous setting.
Since each nal good monopolist employs unskilled labor to manufacture each commodity, the
unskilled labor market equilibrium is
N(t)0 =
Z 1
0
q!d! =
Z 1
0
N(t)

c
!
+
G!
!

d! = N(t) [ c+ 
] : (12)
Therefore:
c =
0   

 
; (13)
where   =
R 1
0
1
!
d! and 
 =
R 1
0
G!
!
d!. Eq.s (8), (10), and (11) imply that
N(t)
!
(c+G!) = bwHX!
+ I!   n
(!   1) , (14)
which - since wH = 0  and (13) holds - can be rewritten as:
1
!

0   

 
+G!

=
b
0   x!
+ I!   n
!   1 , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (15)
where x!  X!N denotes the population-adjusted degrees of complexity of product !. Similarly,
skilled labor market equilibrium implies:
(0 + 1  2) (1  0)=2 = b
Z 1
0
I!x!d!. (16)
9The acronym TEG refers to the temporary e¤ects on growth of policy measures such as innovation
subsidies and tari¤s: they cannot alter the steady state per-capita growth rate, which is instead pinned down by
the population growth rate. For this reason these type of frameworks are also called semi-endogenousgrowth
models.
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In steady state all per-capita variables are constant and therefore
:
X(!;s)
X(!;s)
= n. Hence (TEG)
implies: I = n=. As usual in semi-endogenous growth models with increasing complexity the
steady state arrival rate of innovation in every industry is a linear increasing function of the
population growth rate. Hence we can rewrite (15) and (16) as follows:
1
!

0   

 
+G!

=
b
0   x!
+ n=  n
!   1 , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (17)
(0 + 1  2) (1  0)=2 = bn

Z 1
0
x!d!  bn

x. (18)
Proposition 1 If 
  G
 
< (1 2)(+n= n)
2n
a steady state always exists for every distribution
of ! > 1 and G! > 0. At each steady state the following properties hold:
a. G! > G!0 implies x! > x!0 and @x!=@G! > @x!0=@G!0 i¤ ! > !0
b. 0 is an increasing function of 

Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1a suggests that an increases in government spending in a sector ! stimu-
lates innovation in that specic sector through a market size e¤ect - according to (TEG) the
di¢ culty index x! is proportional to investment in innovation in sector !. Moreover the propo-
sition shows that 1 dollar of government spending is more e¤ective in stimulating innovation
when directed towards sectors with high quality jumps. The importance of proposition 1b
will be more clear later, for the moment it su¢ ces to notice that it shows that the share of
unskilled workers 0 is increasing with the technology-adjusted average government spending

.10
5 Fiscal policy rules
Here we specify rules for public spending and derive the two basic results of the paper. The
scal policy rule that we use is a linear combination of two extreme rules: a perfectly symmetric
rule in which every sector gets the same share of public spending, that is G! = G , and a
rule that allocates public spending in proportion to the quality jump in innovation, that is
G! = G
!

. Finally, the linear combination of the two extreme rules yields the general rule
G! = (1  )G+ G
 
!=

, with 0    1.
10The average goverment spending is G =
R 1
0
G!d!:
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Proposition 2 Every move from a symmetric rule to a rule that promotes more the sectors
with quality jumps above average, that is an increase in , produces a decrease in 
 , which
implies a decrease in the share of the population that decide not to acquireskills , and an
increase in the skill-premium wH .
Proof. The general rule yields 
 = G
hR 1
0
1 
!
d! + 

i
and deriving 
 with respect to  we
get @
=@ = G
h
  R 1
0
1
!
d! + 1

i
: Jensens inequality implies that @
=@ < 0. Thus, a shift
to a more asymmetric spending (an increase in  ) decreases 
 that, according to proposition
1.a, generate a decrease in the share of the population that decide not to acquire skills, 0.
Recalling that the skill premium is wH = = (0   ) we conclude that an higher  leads to
higher wage inequality.
Proposition 2 contains the basic result of the model: when government switches to a policy
promoting high-tech sectors, as it has been the case in the US during the 1980s and 1990s, there
is a decrease of the relative supply of unskilled workers and an increase of the skill premium.
This theoretical result matches two stylized facts of the US labor market: the increase in the
skill premium and the increase in the relative supply of skilled workers (see Acemoglu 2002a
gure 1).
Propositions 2 contains results that are not attainable with the baseline Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom model, and are directly related to our asymmetric-industry setting. In fact, the
policy shift that we describe would not have any e¤ect on the skill premium in a setting with
symmetric steady states. One dollar of public money in high-tech yields more additional prots
than those lost taking one dollar away from low-tech sectors - markups are larger in high-tech
- and the net result is an increase in aggregate prots and innovation activity.11 When sectors
are symmetric the prot rate is the same in all industries and aggregate prots would not be
a¤ected by a reshu­ ing of government spending.
6 Econometric Analysis
In this section, we test statistically the direct and indirect mechanism highlighted in this paper:
using established US data, we will look for a positive e¤ect of government spending on innova-
11>From (9) we know that ! coincides with the markup over the unit cost for the sector !:
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tion and the skill premium, via its positive e¤ect on private R&D expenditure. The calibration
exercise of the next section will provide a structural analysis of the quantitative e¤ect of public
spending on wage inequality.
With a rst regression, we explore the e¤ects of the composition of public spending on
private investment in R&D, as a share of GDP, in the U.S. for the period 1953-2001. We
nd that public investment in E&S, as a share of total public investment, has a positive and
substantial e¤ect on private R&D.
TABLE I
Public spending composition and R&D investment
dependent variable: R&D/GDP
regressors: coe¤ prob
GE&S/GI 0:295992 0:0487
R&D/GDP(-1) 0:951597 0:0000
n. of obs. adjusted 55
R-squared 0:98449
Adjusted R-squared 0:984111
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1:051945 prob = 0:407103
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 6:511739 prob = 0:368366
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
The regression results reported in table show positive e¤ects of government investment
in E&S. Precisely, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of government E&S over total
government investment rises current R&D over GDP by 0:29 percentage points. Notice that
we have not used the constant as it was not signicant even at 10%. Since there is a lagged
dependent variable among the regressors the Durbin-Watson statistic - equal to 1:649982 - for
serial correlation is not valid. Therefore we performed a Ljung-Box Q-statistics which rejects
the null hypothesis of residuals autocorrelation. We also performed Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange
multiplier tests12, which rejects the null hypothesis of residuals serial correlation at all lags.
Both explanatory variables, when subjected to an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test do not
prove stationary: they t in the null hypothesis of a unit root. Therefore we performed an
ADF test on the regression residuals. Fortunately the test statistics13 is equal to  5:663348
which also passes the stricter Engle e Yoos (1987) version of the unit root test. Therefore the
12One, with four lags, is reported in Table I.
13
Mac Kinnons test critical values are: 1% level ,  2:615093; 5% level,  1:947975; 10% level,  1:612408.
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regression is reliable.
We also looked at the what the data say about the relationship between non-federal R&D
expenditure and skill premium. Here we have a shorter time series, 1963-1999, due to skill
premium data (taken from Krusell et al., 2000) availability, but the results are good, as shown
in the following table:
TABLE II
R&D investment and skill premium
dependent variable: skill premium
regressors: coe¤ prob
R&D/GDP 0.047074 0.0388
skill premium(-1) 0.961224 0:0000
n. of obs. adjusted 36
R-squared 0.914528
Adjusted R-squared 0.912015
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1.213211 prob = 0.325839
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 5.003754 prob = 0.286913
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
Also in this case the Durbin-Watson statistic - equal to 1:614102 - is invalidated by the
presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors. Hence we performed Q-tests
and LM tests14, showing no serial correlation of residuals at all lags. Since non-stationary
time series are involved also in this regression, we performed an ADF test on the regression
residuals, obtaining statistic15 value  5:505896, which also passes the stricter Engle e Yoos
(1987) version of the unit root test. This regression is therefore reliable too.
In light of the evidence reported in this section, we can say that the US data suggest the
presence of:
 a positive and highly signicant e¤ect of the equipment and structure fraction of govern-
ment investment on the private R&D/GDP ratio;
 a positive and highly signicant e¤ect of the private R&D/GDP ratio on the skilled
wage/unskilled wage ratio.
We can now wonder how these two e¤ects concur in a unique indirect e¤ect of public
investment composition on the skill premium. This is assessed by directly estimating this
e¤ect, as reported in the next regression:
14One, with four lags, is reported in Table I.
15Mac Kinnons test critical values at 1% level of signicance is  3:639407.
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TABLE III
Public spending composition and skill premium
dependent variable: skill premium
regressors: coe¤ prob
GE&S/GI 0.137137 0.0388
skill premium(-1) 0.976489 0:0000
n. of obs. adjusted 36
R-squared 0.917077
Adjusted R-squared 0.914638
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1.373256 prob = 0.266687
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 5.562143 prob = 0.234321
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
Also in this case the Durbin-Watson statistic - equal to 1:640411 - is invalidated by the
presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors. Hence we performed Q-tests
and LM tests16, rejecting serial correlation of residuals at all lags. Since non-stationary time
series are involved also in this regression, we performed an ADF test on the regression residuals,
obtaining statistic17 value -5:817913, which also passes the stricter Engle e Yoos (1987) version
of the unit root test. This regression is therefore reliable too.
7 Numerical analysis
In this section we calibrate a two-sector version of the model. All the results obtained for
the model with a continuum of sectors hold for this shortcut version. The calibration allows
an assessment of the quantitative e¤ects of government policy on the skill premium. Since,
as we saw in section 2, the only available data on public spending composition are those on
investment, in the calibration exercise we need to reinterpret the model in terms of intermediate
goods. As it is well know in the literature an alternative interpretation of quality ladders models
is one where households consume a homogeneous consumption good which is assembled from
di¤erentiated intermediate goods. The static utility function in (1) can be then interpreted
as a CRS production function where better quality intermediate goods are more productive in
manufacturing the nal good.18
16One, with four lags, is reported in Table I.
17Mac Kinnons test critical values at 1% level of signicance is  2:634731.
18See Grossman and Helpman (1991) ch. 4.
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7.1 Calibration
The exercise consists of choosing the 8 parameters of the model fD;Tr; ; ; n; ; 1; 2g to
match salient long-run features of the U.S. economy. Since we work with intermediate goods
we need to choose our unit of time to be large enough to match the average life of intermediate
goods. For this purpose we choose ve years as our unit of time.19 After calibrating the model
we explore the e¤ects of government policy on the skill premium between the two 5-years
periods, 1976-80 and 1987-91.20 We rst compute the increase in the skill premium produced
by shocking the model with the change in the composition of public spending showed in gure
1 and we compare it with the increase in the skill premium observed in the data. Later, we
introduce the R&D subsidy and repeat the exercise for this policy shock.
The calibration of some parameters is standard. We set , which in steady state is equal to
the interest rate r, to 0:07 to match the average real return on the stock market for the past
century of 7 percent, estimated in Mehra and Prescott (1985).21 We calibrate n to match the
population growth rate of 1:14%, as in Jones and Williams (2000). Since our time unit is 5
years both  and n must be multiplied by ve, as we do in table II below. We choose the total
working life time D = 40 as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), and the total training time
Tr = 5, to match the average years of college in the US - both values are adjusted for our time
unit in table II.22 We choose the threshold  to bound the relative supply of unskilled workers
above 75 percent of the workforce, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
The crucial parameters of the calibration are the R&D di¢ culty index , and the quality
jumps of the low and high-tech sectors, 1 and 2 respectively. We calibrate the quality jumps
using estimates of the sectorial markups for 2-digit US manufacturing rms. We use Roeger
(1995) estimates, which are the most conservative among the several others that we explored
19Since there is no capital in the model we consider intermediate goods as fully depreciating every period.
Average full depreciation period of intermediate goods is 8-10 years. We choose the lenght of a period to be
not greater of the average training time, which we assume to be 5 years.
20We choose 1976-80 as the starting year because it corresponds to the moment when the composition of
public spending starts moving faster towards high-tech goods, and it is also very close to the turning point of
the dynamics of the skill premium. The choice of 1987-1991 as second period is due to the fact that estimates
for the e¤ective R&D tax credit rate are available only up to 1991.
21Jones andWilliams (2000) suggest that the interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium
rate of return to R&D, and so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is
around 1%. They in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0:04 to
0:14.
22Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) use a training time of four years, we stretch it to ve to match our time
unit of ve years.
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both in the levels and sectorial di¤erences. We use the revised OECD classication of high-tech
and low-tech sectors as in Hatzichronoglu (1997)23. Specically we take the lower bound of
both high-tech and low-tech groups in Roegers estimates, that is, we consider a 15 percent and
34 percent markups for low and high-tech respectively24. In the ve-years time frame we are
working with this imply setting 1 = (1 + 0:15  5) = 1: 75 and 2 = 1 + 0:34  5 = 2: 7.
Once we calibrated the two quality jumps we can use the equation for the growth rate to
obtain the di¢ culty index parameter .
g =
:
u
u
= I
Z 1
0
log !d! =
n

1
2
(ln1 + ln2) . (19)
>From Penn World tables we get an average GDP growth rate for the period 1976-1991 in the
U.S. of 2:3 percent and using the quality jumps, calibrated as explained above, we obtain 
equals to 0:067, which is the parameter of the R&D di¢ culty index25.
To account for the real weight of public investment expenditure on the overall economy we
introduce government investment as a share of total private investment.26 Therefore we set
! =
G!
c
and the demand (8) becomes:
cN(t)
!
+
N(t)!c
!
=
N(t)c
!
(1 + !) = q!:
Working out the equilibrium with this modication and reducing the system to one equation
- as we did in (A.1.1) - and substituting wH = 0  into it we obtain a relation between the
skill premium and the composition of public spending (share of low-tech goods G1
c
and share of
high-tech goods G2
c
):
23In our high-tech group we include sectors classied as high-tech and medium high-tech in Hatzichronoglu
(1997), and similarly we contruct our low-tech group.
24We are aware of using di¤erent sector classications for markups and for public investment. This is due
to lack of estimates of markups for E&S and strucutures, and to lack of data on goverment procurement by
industry. This simplication does not seem to be problematic because calibrating the markups using di¤erent
growth rates for E&S and structures we would obtain a similar picture. In fact, calibrating  externally we could
use two separate growth equations, g1 = (n=) ln1 and g2 = (n=) ln2, and estimates of the growth rates in
E&S and structure to calibrate 1 and 2. Cummins and Violante (2002) nd that average technical change
in E&S in the last 30 years in the U.S. to be between 5 and 6 percent. Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999)
nd a 1 percent yearly average structures-specic technical change in the last three decades. We performed this
exercise and obtained similar calibrated values for the two quality jumps.
25We use equal weights for the two sectors for simplicity. We have also performed the exercise using some
measure of the weights of the high-tech and low-tech sectors in the real economy and we get similar results.
Morover, using similar weight seems more appropriate in a stylized model like ours where the R&D di¢ culty is
common for both sectors.
26Private spending in the model, labeled c, is consumption. In the calibration, since we work with investment
data, private spending is private investment.
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

wH
+ 1  

1  
wH
+ 

=2 =
n( 
wH
)
(+ n=  n)
 
wH
+ 1
  + 	
 
1    +   	 ; (20)
where :  =
R 1
0
!d! = 0:5  G1c + 0:5  G2c and 	 =
R 1
0
!
!
d! = 0:5  G11c + 0:5  G22c . Table IV
below summarizes our parameterscalibration.
TABLE IV
Summary of calibration
parameter value moment to match source
D 8 life time after college Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
T 1 years of college Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
 0:15 interest rate Jones and Williams (2000)
n 0:07 population growth rate Jones and Williams (2000)
 0:75 low-bound for the share of unskilled workers Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
 0:43 GDP growth rate of 2:3% Penn World Tables
1 1:75 low-tech markup of 15% Roeger (1995)
2 2:7 high-tech markup of 34% Roeger (1995)
For the policy variables on public spending we use BEA NIPA data on government invest-
ment in structure (G1), our low-tech aggregate, and E&S (G2), our high-tech aggregate27. NIPA
data on public expenditure shows the following composition in the two periodsof interest: in
1976-80 average government investment in structure was 29 percent and in E&S sectors was
7 percent of total private investment (G1
c
= 0:29 and G2
c
= 0:07); in the period 1987-91 the
low-tech expenditure share decreases to 26 percent and the high-tech share rises to 18 percent.
This change in the composition of public spending in favor of high-tech sectors produces, in our
calibrated model, a 2:1 percent increase in the skill premium. For the observed skill premium
we use CPS data from Krusell, et al. (2000) on average wages of college graduates and high-
school graduates. In the period considered this measure of the skill premium increased by 17:8
percent. Hence, our demand composition shock can explain 12 percent of the total increase in
the skill premium showed in the data.28
27Notice that here we do not exactly use the scal policy rules specied in section 5. This is because when
in this shortcut version of the model those rules would not allow us to catch the entire e¤ect of a change in
the composition of public spending on the skill premium. In fact, in the case of extreme asymmetric spending
( = 1) our rule predicts that the low-tech sector gets a share of the public spending that is proportional to
its quality jump. While, in the real world the extreme asymmetry would mean that the spending going to the
low-tech sector would be zero (G1 = 0). Thus, to keep the model closer to the real world in the calibration
excercise we use directly government expenditure in the two sectors as an index of spending composition.
28The measure of inequality that we use, wH=wL, might overstate the increase in the skill premium when
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In Table III below we study the sensitivity of the results to changes in the di¤erence of
the sectorial quality jumps, which is a proxy of the technology gapbetween the two sets of
industries. We leave 1 unchanged and increase 2 to match an average markup of 87 percent -
the high-tech sector average in Roegers estimates. We nd that the percentage of the observed
skill premium explained by the model improves with a higher technology gap.
TABLE V
change in the skill premium explained by policy shocks
2 = 2:7 2 = 5:35
Spending Composition 0:12 0:25
Subsidy 0:20 0:20
Joint shock 0:32 0:46
Next, we introduce in the model a policy measure that reduces the cost of innovation in the
form of a simple symmetric innovation subsidy. Innovation subsidies are funded with lump-
sum taxes, in the same fashion as public spending, therefore governments balanced budget
condition becomes T (t) =
R 1
0
G!(t)d! + sr(t) - s is a subsidy to innovation equal for both
sectors. It is easy to show, using households intertemporal budget constraint, that the increase
in subsidies does not crowd out private expenditure because additional taxes are returned to
consumers in the form of higher prots. Therefore, subsidies increase prots symmetrically in
all industries. This suggests that an increase in innovation subsidies rises aggregate prots and
aggregate investment in innovation, thus increasing the skill premium. With R&D subsidies
the equilibrium condition used for the calibration (20) changes in the following way:


wH
+ 1  

1  
wH
+ 

=2 =
n( 
wH
)
(1  s)(+ n=  n)

0
  + 	
 
1    +   	 :
(21)
The data on the R&D subsidy implicit in the R&D Tax Credit are taken from Hall (1993)
estimates that are, to date, the only that directly compute the e¤ective credit rate. The annual
across-sectors average credit rate varies between 3:04 percent in 1981 and 7:49 percent in 1991.
we bring the model to the data. The reason is that the average wage of skilled workers in the model isR 1
0
(  )wHdF () which is smaller than wH . We do not use this measure in the calibration because there is a
semplication in the model that counterbalances the overstatement of the skill premium generated by using wH
as average skilled wages. In fact we assumed that unskilled workers do not accumulate human capital, and so
their average wage is simply wL. In the data average wages of both skilled and unskilled are computed taking
into account the abilities, or human capital, of heterogeneous workers in the two groups. So using wL in the
model for the average unskilled wage understates the real measure of the skill premium. Our take is to leave
human capital accumulation out of the measure of inequality in the calibration to avoid distortions in both
directions.
20
In our starting period, 1976-80 the credit is 0, since it was introduced in 1981, in the ending
period, 1987-91, the average credit rate is estimated to be around 4 percent per year. It turns
out that the introduction of the subsidy alone produces a 3:8 percent increase in the skill
premium, accounting for about 20 percent of the real change in the skill premium over the
period.
As we can see in table III, the incentive e¤ect of an innovation subsidy is not very sensitive
to changes in the technology gap. This happens because although an increase in 2 raises
the markup of high-tech rms, so stimulating innovation, it also raises the innovation di¢ culty
index , as calibrated in (19), so worsening the incentives to innovate.
8 Discussion
We conclude this section with some remarks on the predictions of the model and on the quan-
titative results obtained in the calibration.
R&D expenditure and wage inequality. Even though R&D is not the sole innovation
activity stimulated by our policy shocks it is an important part of it, and the model indirectly
predicts a positive linkage between R&D expenditure and the skill-premium. Figure 3 shows a
common shift in the trend of the private R&D share of GDP and of the skill premium in the late
1970s early 1980s. Machin and Van Reenen (1998), using industry-specic R&D intensity as an
indicator of technology, nd a strong correlation between technical change and skill upgrading
in the U.S. in the 1980s29. More precisely, they nd that both R&D intensity and the wage
share of non-production workers grew in the 1980s, and that R&D intensity is a signicative
regressor for the wage and employment share of non-production workers in all manufacturing
sectors. In addition to this they also show that while skill-upgrading is observed within all
industries, it appears to be more intense in high-tech sectors.
Within and between-industry changes. In our model the demand-composition shock
produces skill-upgrading in high-tech sectors and deskilling in low-tech sectors, while R&D sub-
sidies increase the relative demand for skills in all sectors. The extent to which R&D subsidies
compensate for the negative skill-upgrading in low-tech industries produced by government ex-
penditures depends on the parameters of the model and on the relative strength of the two types
29Their analysis included also other OECD countries.
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of policies. Hence, in principle, the model could predict skill-upgrading and increasing wage
inequality in both high-tech and low-tech sectors, with higher intensity in the former group
of industries -in accordance to the evidence in Machin and Van Reenen (1998). In the bench-
mark calibration the share of wage inequality attributable to our within-industry mechanism,
triggered by the R&D subsidy, is about 20 per cent, while the between-industry mechanism,
the demand composition shock, explains about 12 percent. There is consensus in the literature
that most of the recent increase in wage inequality is explained by within-industry changes
and that between-industry changes play a minor but non-negligible role. Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994), for instance, nd that between-industry changes explain about one third of
the total increase in the share of the wage bill of non production workers in the period 1979-87.
Moreover, they nd that the primary source of inequality induced by between-industry changes
was explained by defense procurement.30
The recent empirical literature on sector-specic technical change conrms the idea that
high-tech sectors have been the major engine of innovation in the last decades.31 Cummins
and Violante (2002) nd that average technical change in E&S in the last 30 years in the
U.S. to be between 5 and 6 percent. In this literature the change in E&S is proxied by the
di¤erence in growth rates between constant-quality consumption prices and quality-adjusted
prices of investment in E&S. The substantial decline of the quality-adjusted price of capital
equipment since the early 1970s provides evidence of E&S-specic technical change. Recently
some empirical works have showed that, although technical change in structures is less relevant
than that in equipment goods, it has been positive and signicative in the last decades. Gort,
Greenwood and Rupert (1999) nd a 1 percent yearly average structures-specic technical
change in the last three decades. In line with this evidence, the demand-pull e¤ect of public
spending composition reduces the quality-adjusted prices of high-tech goods more than those
of low-tech goods.
R&D subsidies. Even though the incremental feature of the tax credit reduced its e¤ective
rate, as we explained in section 2, there is extensive evidence showing that it did have an impact
on private innovation. Hall (1993) working on rm-level data nds that private innovation
responds to reductions in the after-tax cost of R&D -often called the tax price of R&D. In her
30They rely on evidence that defense related industries tend to employ a large proportion of non production
workers, especially with the emphasis put on high-tech weapons since the late 1970s (see also OHanlon, 2000).
31See Hornstein et al. (2005).
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estimates the tax price elasticity of R&D is larger than one, which means that a 5 per cent
e¤ective R&D tax credit leads to a 5 percent average increase in R&D at the rm level. These
ndings are conrmed by those in Hines (1993) that uses di¤erent econometric methods, and
by those in Baily and Lawrence (1992) based on macro data. Bloom, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen
(2002) nd an elasticity around unity for a panel of countries including the U.S. in the period
1981-99.
Autonomous private innovation. We want to emphasize that our analysis is not meant
to exclude or downplay any autonomous role of private innovation. Indeed, one could introduce
asymmetry in private spending and study the e¤ects of changes in its composition, showed in
gure 2, on the wage structure. We expect that the shift in public spending composition will be
relatively more relevant in the 1980s, and private spending composition will be the main factor
in the 1990s. Moreover, changes in the economic environment, such as trade liberalization
and increasing international technological competition, might have led U.S. rms to invest in
"defensive" innovation independently of the incentives produced by the innovation cost-reducing
policies introduced in the 1908s.32 These are di¤erent sources of innovation and wage inequality
that complement the ones studied in our paper.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown both theoretically and empirically that the technological content of
government procurement played a non-negligible role in explaining the wave of innovations that
hit the U.S. economy in recent decades and its e¤ects on the wage structure. The interaction
between policy and the heterogeneous industry structure yields the basic theoretical contri-
bution of the paper: a shift in the composition of public spending towards highly innovative
sectors increases the aggregate expenditure in innovation and the skill premium.
The incentive to innovate produced by changes in the composition of public spending, and
by R&D subsidies, are the two channels through which public policy a¤ects technology and
the wage structure. Our empirical assessment of the policy channelcontributes to the recent
literature on the endogenous determinants of skill-biased and skill-using technical change. We
32Thoenig and Verdier (2003) show that skill-biased innovation can be introduced by national rms in defense
of their leadership threatened by increasing international competition.
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identify and quantify the role of a new source of technical change, government policy, which
complements the role of international trade (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999 and Acemoglu
2003) and of the relative supply of skills (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, and Kiley 1998).
It represents a rst attempt to evaluate the e¤ects of policy on technology and wages and it
is amenable to many extensions. Further research is needed to ll the data gap that prevents a
more rigorous evaluation of the magnitude of the policy e¤ects on wages. Lacking data on the
technological composition of aggregate government procurement, in our empirical analyses we
have used the only available sub-sample: the composition of government investment. Despite
the striking validation of our theory provided by such data, a larger sample of government
procurement would certainly rene the results. On the one hand, some e¤ort should be devoted
to the collection of data on the composition of public consumption between high and low-tech
sectors; this would allow a better quantitative assessment of our demand-side policy channel.
Moreover, it could be interesting to introduce asymmetric private spending and evaluate the
relative importance of public and private spending composition in producing a demand-driven
mechanism of innovation and inequality.
On the other hand, a better measurement of the magnitude of the technology transfer
and intellectual property protection policies could provide a more complete assessment of the
e¤ects of the innovation cost-reducing policies introduced in the 1980s. Once in possession of
better data the model could be extended with the introduction of a broader set of supply-side
policy tools, such as, patent policies, as in ODonogue and Zweimuller (2004), and a mechanism
through which public technology is transferred to private rms. A calibration exercise on this
extended framework could increase the fraction of inequality attributable to innovation policies.
Finally, another extension would open up our economy and endogenize the shift in technol-
ogy policy making it dependent on some indicator of international competitiveness. Market-
oriented technology policy could then be an optimal policy response to the loss of international
competition of the U.S. economy due to trade liberalization and technology di¤usion.33
10 Appendix
Proof of the existence of the steady state. Solving (17) for x! and integrating it w.r.t. !
we get:
33A rst step in this direction is taken in Impullitti (2005).
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and substituting this into (18) we obtain the following synthetic equilibrium condition:
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The LHS of this eq. (A11) is a strictly concave quadratic polynomial with roots on 2   1
and 1, and the RHS of eq. (A11) is a strictly convex quadratic polynomial with roots  and

  G
1   . It follows that, if the stated parameter restrictions are satised, there exists always one
and only one real and positive solution 0 2 (; 1). The proof follows from the fact that the
specied parameter restriction allows the intercept (the value of the polynomial at 0 = 0)
of the LHS polynomial to be bigger than in intercept of the RHS polynomial. Specically
LHS(0) > RHS(0) implies:
(1  2)=2 > n
(+ n=  n)(

   G
 
);
which rearranged leads to the parameter restriction. It is easy to see that this condition allows
for a unique solution34. Moreover for Minkowskis inequality 
    G < 0, therefore when
1  2 > 0 no restriction on parameters is needed for a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 1.a. Solving (17) for x! we get:

!   1
!

0   

 
+G!

0   
b(+ n=  n) = x!,
and deriving w.r.t. G!we obtain
@x!
@G!
=

!   1
!

0   
b(+ n=  n) ,
which is always positive since ! > 1, 0 >  and  > n. From this derivative we can also
see that @x!=@G! > @x!0=@G!0 when (!   1) =! > (!0   1) =!0 which is always true if
! > !0.
Proof of Proposition 1.b Rearranging (A11) we get a single polynomial in 0 and 
:
34It is easy to check that all parameters restriction are satised by the number we use in the calibration
excercise.
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F (0; 
) =
n(0   )
(+ n=  n)

(0   
) (  1   1) + (G  
)
  (0 + 1  2) (1  0)=2.
(A.1.2)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we get:
d0
d

=
 @F=@

@F=@0
=
=
n(0 )
(+n= n) 
n
(+n= n)

(0   
) (  1   1) + (G  
)

+ n(0 )
(+n= n)( 
 1   1) +  (0   )
> 0
This results follows from the fact that 0 > ,  > n,   1 > 1 and nally, from (A1) we
know that the expression inside the square brackets is greater than zero.
10.1 The Research & Experimentation Tax Credit and the struc-
tural change in the U.S. innovation policy
The Research & Experimentation Tax Credit, part of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, was es-
tablished by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The tax credit was part of a more general
strategy implemented by policy makers in the late 1970s and in the 1980s that was directly tar-
geted to stimulate commercial innovation and enhance the competitiveness of American rms
in the global economy. This represented a substantial shift in innovation policy with respect
to the post-war government practice of primarily funding military technology and obtaining
commercial innovation only through spillover e¤ects. The change might have been triggered by
the recovery of European and Japanese economies from the war in the 1970s, and intensied
by the eclipse of the Soviets military power as a treat to U.S. security in the mid-1980s.35
In the 1980s we observe the introduction of new policy tools aimed at facilitating rms
access to public technology, improve intellectual property rights and, more in general, reduce the
private cost of innovation. Examples are: the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986 that transformed federal laboratories into sources of innovation for U.S.
rms; the establishment in 1982 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which improved
35For an interpretation along these lines see Ham and Mowery (1999).
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the protection granted to patents holders; the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, which
reduced antitrust persecutions of joint ventures for pre-commercial research. Mowery (1998)
describes this set of policies as a "structural change in the U.S. national innovation system".
There is a su¢ cient consensus among technology policy scholars that the post-1980 policy shift,
started during the Reagan and Bush administrations and continued as a trademark of Clintons
economic policy, represents a crucial move towards an explicit commercial innovation policy in
the U.S. history.36
Unfortunately there is no available quantitative measures of the e¤ects of technology transfer
and of property rights policies on the cost of innovation. For lack of data we focus only on the
e¤ects of the R&E tax credit on innovation and inequality. Hall (1993) estimates the average
e¤ective R&D credit rate relative to the R&E Tax Credit by computing the reduction in the tax
price of R&D produced by the credit. The estimated e¤ective rate uctuates between 3 and 7
percent of the cost of R&D in the period 1981-91. Thus, although the legislation set the o¢ cial
credit rate around 20 per cent, the e¤ective credit rate has been on average around 4 per cent
of R&D at the rm level. This gap is due to the incremental design of the credit: by increasing
the current R&D investment a rm will increase its current total tax credit but it will also
raise the base level of R&D above which the credit is granted for the following three years.37
Although the credit rate has been pretty constant over the years its incremental feature was
designed to generate a persistent incentive for private rms to increase their R&D investment
over time.
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